What are the key differences and similarities between the international peace-making processes which followed the first and second world wars, respectively?
Introduction
The aim that both international orders followed after the First World War and the Second World War was to safeguard “peace and democracy” in Europe and the wider world.[1] However, the First World War has often been critiqued for leaving “much unfinished business” which historians link to the Second World War.[2] Equally, the ‘“cold war” has been viewed as a consequence of the Second World War.’[3] The varying impacts that international peace-making processes had on international relations and their role as causations for future conflicts leads this essay to compare the similarities and differences between the two processes.
A similarity between the processes was the internal tensions amongst the victors, post-war. Another was the emergence of small-scale resistance from the defeated. A key difference lies in Britain’s role as a world financier, which remained influential after the First World War but declined dramatically after the Second. Subsequently, this essay argues that there are more significant similarities than differences regarding the international peace-making processes that followed the First and Second World Wars.
Tensions Amongst the Victors
A similarity between the peace-making processes of both the first and second world wars were the tensions that existed between the victor nations. Lord Robert Cecil, Britain’s Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, noted in his diary during the Paris Peace Conference 1919: “both Lansing and House urged upon me that the people of the United States were by no means unanimous in support of the League of Nations.”[4] This represents the growing scepticism amongst American public opinion with regard to the creation of the League of Nations and the over-reliance on the United States (hereafter, US) that may follow. This is significant in comparison to the people in Europe, as “the people of France and Italy and, as I told him, of England also were keenly in favour”.[5] Cecil’s diary highlights the contrasting public opinions between America and Europe in 1919, as America was sceptical, whereas Europe was in favour. This is partly attributable to the time in which both victors had been at war, as Europe had been at war since July 1914 whereas the US joined in April 1917. Therefore, Europeans were willing to invest in an international institution to preserve peace, despite the economic and political cost, to a greater degree than the US.
The tensions amongst the allies after the First World War are comparable to the growing tensions between the Allies and the Soviets following the Second World War. This was conveyed in a “List of Requests for Tours by BRIXMIS in the Soviet Zone”.[6] BRIXMIS was an organisation within the British Army designed to act as a liaison between British and Soviet commander-in-chiefs in their respective zones. The role of BRIXMIS becomes increasingly important as British requests to observe “Tank Battalion or Company in training”, “Soviet Air Force Fighter Station”, and “Infantry Battalion or Company training”. These were denied as “no visits to military units could be permitted “at the present time”.’[7] The Soviets’ decision to deny the British access to their training facilities displays that just over two years since the end of the Second World War, divisions amongst the victors were developing as both sides grew fearful of the other and their ulterior motives. This resembles the tensions that existed amongst the allies at the end of the First World War. After the First World War, public opinion between the American and European powers, was deeply divided over forming the League of Nations. This correlates to the growing tensions between the British and Soviets after the Second World War, due to the fear of the “other” that developed, leading; the British to be denied access to Soviet training facilities. Therefore, despite their wartime alliance, both the Americans and Europeans and the British and Soviets became divided due to varying visions of post-war international institutions or suspicions over military tactics.
Small-scale Resistance
A further similarity between the peace-making processes between the two conflicts is the experience of small-scale resistance to peace. The British Foreign Office recorded—"The Germans have failed in the following respects to comply with the terms of the Armistice . . . [claiming] they have insufficient tugs to transfer 21 submarines from Germany to England by 17th February, 1919.”[8] This note suggests that the German Navy was resisting the terms of the Armistice by preventing the transfer of 21 submarines to the British. Subsequently, the German Navy resisted the Armistice and the resulting Treaty of Versailles, which banned Germany from having submarines. This act of resistance to the terms of the Armistice foreshadows the scuttling of the German fleet at Scapa Flow in June 1919, as they feared the British would ‘seize the German warships and incorporate them in the Royal Navy.’[9] Subsequently, there were notable acts of resistance from the defeated Germans to the terms of the peace proscribed in the Armistice. Furthermore, the Foreign Office noted the “break up [of] several submarines instead of surrendering them” and that ‘they refused to provide crews for these submarines’.[10] Consequently, there was notable small-scale resistance to the terms of peace the Allies dictated to Germany, leading the Germans being unable to transfer submarines to Britain, provide crews for the submarines, to disable the submarines, representing the resistance the fleet would adopt at Scapa Flow.
Small-scale resistance to the Armistice experienced by the British following the First World War was also displayed at the end of the Second World War. An Air Ministry Secret Intelligence Summary, noted “a number of possible causes of unrest”.[11] Of these “causes’ the Air Ministry noted one particular group, “the young Nazi-minded officers . . . men trained to lead and with little or no experience of the labour market.”[12] These returning officers of the Wehrmacht generated concern for occupying British forces, especially during the “winter months”, as it was believed that their lack of purpose upon returning from P.O.W. camps would lead to a resurgence in Nazi ideology.[13] Subsequently, British forces feared a growth in Nazi ideology and a return to fascist movements in Germany particularly as material conditions worsened over the winter of 1946. Fears of resistance to British occupation extended to university students, as “even with the most careful scrutiny the “Studetenschaft” will inevitably be drawn from people thoroughly indoctrinated with Nazi ideas.”[14] This disturbed the Air Ministry due to the estimated “12,000 students” in the British Zone. The possible radicalisation of these students through an indoctrinated leadership had the potential for a resurgence in grass-roots fascism. Consequently, after both the First and Second World Wars there was evident resistance to the terms of peace, as the Germans deliberately damaged their own submarines and later the whole fleet to prevent them from being handed over to the British. Equally, the Air Ministry feared small-scale resistance from returning officers of the Wehrmacht and the influence indoctrinated staff may have on university students in the British Zone.
Britain’s Role as a World Financier
A key difference between the international peace-making processes between the two conflicts lies in Britain’s role as a world financier. Following the First World War, Britain played a significant role in the international peace-making process as one of the world’s creditor nations, despite costing the “British Empire [. . .] £6,660,000,000”.[15] This is significant as, despite the vast cost to the Empire, Britian remained an important international political player due to its economic strength. Britain’s strength in international peace-making is visible in its role within the League of Nations. In a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, it was noted how ‘an official request to H.M. Lords Commissioners, [asked] them to permit the British Controller and Auditor-General to audit the accounts of the League of Nations for the first budgetary period.’[16] Subsequently, Britain’s international role as a financier was extended after the First World War, as the Council of the League of Nations supported the concept that a ‘British Controller and Auditor-General’ should regulate the finance accounts of the League for the first session. Consequently, despite the enormous financial burden the war imposed, Britain sustained its role as a financier, especially with regard to international peace; it was a British official to manage the accounts of the League.
However, Britain’s role varied significantly after the Second World War. Noted in a letter between E. Rowe-Dutton, the Treasury and C. F. Cobbold, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, “the Chancellor agreed “reluctantly” to the last $200 million which we have just asked Munro to arrange for about a week hence.”[17] It can be inferred that Britain’s international position was dramatically weaker following the Second World War. Rather than Britain play an influential role in forming the international institutions as a result of the peace-making process, it became evident that Britain would become dependent on them, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton was compelled to borrow “$200 million” from the US due to the vast debts Britain had incurred from the cost of the war. Furthermore, the Bank of England discussed “drawing Canadian dollars from the Fund on the understanding that the Canadians would draw U.S. dollars”.[18] Britain’s role shifted towards being a receiver rather than an issuer of credit. Therefore, Britian’s financial role in international peace-making was significantly different following the Second World War, as it became dependent on US credit and the IMF. By comparison Britain had been instrumental in upholding new international institutions through its role as a finance auditor after the First World War.
Conclusion
There are stronger similarities between the international peace-making processes after the First and Second World Wars than differences. There were significant tensions amongst the Allies with American and European public opinion divided over the formation of the League of Nations. Furthermore, British-Soviet relations declined during 1947, when the Soviets denied British access to military training facilities, demonstrating growing distrust between them. Equally, small-scale resistance followed both conflicts, as the Germans damaged or unmanned submarines to prevent their capture, and Britain’s Air Ministry feared resistance from returning soldiers and students in 1946. The key difference lies in Britain’s role as a financial power, as it retained prominence after the First World War but declined after the Second. Consequently, the international peace-making processes following the First and Second World Wars, shared tensions amongst the Allies and small-scale resistance afterward.
For more sources related to the documents discussed in this essay, please see our collections, Paris Peace Conference and Beyond, 1919–1939, Military Intelligence Files: Land, Sea & Air, 1938–1974, and Establishing the Post-War International Order, 1944–1961.
[1] Mordecai Schreiber, Explaining the Holocaust (The Lutterworth Press, 2015), 19.
[2] Ibid., 19.
[3] John Lukacs, The Legacy of the Second World War (Yale University Press, 2010), 161.
[4] British Online Archives (hereafter, BOA), Paris Peace Conference and Beyond, 1919–1939, "Notes on the Formation of the League of Nations", 8 January, 1919, available at https://britishonlinearchives.com/documents/12022/notes-on-the-formation-of-the-league-of-nations-1919#?xywh=-1468%2C0%2C10128%2C5480&cv=4, image 5.
[5] Ibid.
[6] BOA, Military Intelligence Files: Land, Sea & Air, 1938–1974, “Air Ministry: BRIXMIS organisation and activities, 1949–1956”, 21 October 1949, available at https://britishonlinearchives.com/documents/8378/air-ministry-brixmis-organisation-and-activities-1949-1956#?xywh=-2180%2C0%2C6777%2C3668&cv=133, images 134-135.
[7] Ibid.
[8] BOA, Paris Peace Conference and Beyond, 1919–1939, “Foreign Office records on the disarmament of Germany, 1919–1922”, available at https://britishonlinearchives.com/documents/11919/foreign-office-records-on-the-disarmament-of-germany-1919-1922#?#%23xywh=-3413%2C-232%2C9372%2C4630&cv=9&xywh=-1735%2C-1%2C8364%2C4132, image 10.
[9] International Naval Research Organization, ‘The German Fleet at Scapa Flow”, Warship International, 4 (1967), 198.
[10] BOA, Paris Peace Conference and Beyond, 1919–1939, “Foreign Office records on the disarmament of Germany, 1919–1922”, available at https://britishonlinearchives.com/documents/11919/foreign-office-records-on-the-disarmament-of-germany-1919-1922#?#%23xywh=-3413%2C-232%2C9372%2C4630&cv=9&xywh=-1735%2C-1%2C8364%2C4132, image 10.
[11] BOA, Military Intelligence Files: Land, Sea & Air, 1938–1974, “Royal Air Force: Secret Intelligence, Jan 1946–Dec 1946”, 14 January 1946, available at https://britishonlinearchives.com/documents/8360/royal-air-force-secret-intelligence-jan-1946-dec-1946#?xywh=-1668%2C-1%2C5406%2C2926&cv=26, images 27–28.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] BOA, Paris Peace Conference and Beyond, 1919–1939, “German war reparations, 1919 (i)”, 1919, available at https://britishonlinearchives.com/documents/11930/german-war-reparations-1919-i#?xywh=-1074%2C0%2C6624%2C3584&cv=13, images 14–45.
[16] Kew, The National Archives, CAB 24/109/1, "The Finances of the League of Nations. Resolutions adopted by the Council of the League of Nations, meeting in Rome on 19th May, 1920", 12 July, 1920.
[17] BOA, Establishing the Post-War International Order, 1944–1961, “Access to resources, including UK views on future of IMF., 1947–1950”, 14 April, 1947, available at https://britishonlinearchives.com/documents/19457/access-to-resources-including-uk-views-on-future-of-imf-1947-1950#?xywh=-1817%2C-125%2C5040%2C2490.
[18] Ibid., 14 April, 1947, available at https://britishonlinearchives.com/documents/19457/access-to-resources-including-uk-views-on-future-of-imf-1947-1950#?xywh=-1817%2C-125%2C5040%2C2490.